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Kittur et al. (2004, 2006) and Jung and Hummel (2011, 2014) showed that people have great
difﬁculty learning relation-based categories with a probabilistic (i.e., family resemblance)
structure, in which no single relation is shared by all members of a category.Yet acquisition
of such categories is not strictly impossible: in all these studies, roughly half the participants
eventually learned to criterion. What are these participants doing that the other half
are not? We hypothesized that successful participants were those who divided the
nominal categories into two or more sub-categories, each of which individually had a
deterministic structure. We report three experiments testing this hypothesis: explicitly
presenting participants with hierarchical (category and sub-category) structures facilitated
the acquisition of otherwise probabilistic relational categories, but only when participants
learned the subordinate-level (i.e., deterministic) categories prior to learning the nominal
(i.e., probabilistic) categories and only when they were permitted to view multiple
exemplars of the same category simultaneously. These ﬁndings suggest that one way to
learn natural relational categories with a probabilistic structure [e.g.,Wittgenstein’s (1953),
category game, or even mother ] is by learning deterministic subordinate-level concepts
ﬁrst and connecting them together under a common concept or label.They also add to the
literature suggesting that comparison of multiple exemplars plays an instrumental role in
relational learning.
Keywords: relational category learning, family resemblance, relational invariants, polysemy hypothesis,
comparison, hierarchical categories
INTRODUCTION
One of the most generally accepted assumptions in the litera-
ture on categorization and category learning is that categories
and exemplars are mentally represented as lists of features and
that the process of assigning exemplars to categories is based on
comparing their features (for reviews, see Murphy, 2002; Kit-
tur et al., 2006). As pointed out by Barsalou (1983), Gentner
(1983), Murphy and Medin (1985) and others, one limitation of
this view is that many concepts and categories are based, not
on the literal features of their exemplars, but on relations—
either relations among an exemplar’s features (e.g., arranged in
one way, the parts of a folding bed form a bed, but arranged
in another, they form a couch; Biederman, 1987; Hummel and
Biederman, 1992) or relations between the exemplar and other
objects in the world (e.g., the category conduit is deﬁned by
a relation between the conduit and the thing it carries; bar-
rier is deﬁned by the relation between the barrier, the thing
to which it blocks access and the thing deprived of that access;
even mother is deﬁned by a relation between the mother and her
child. Such concepts include both role-governed categories (Mark-
man and Stilwell, 2001), such as friend, mother, conduit and key,
which are deﬁned by an object’s role relative to another object
and full-blown, multi-role schemas, such as transaction (see, e.g.,
Gentner, 2005; Gentner and Kurtz, 2005; see also Hummel and
Holyoak, 2003). Relational categories may be more the rule than
the exception: informal ratings by Asmuth and Gentner (2005)
of the 100 highest-frequency nouns in the British National Cor-
pus revealed that about half of these nouns refer to relational
concepts. The distinction between relational and feature-based
categories need not pose a problem for the study of category
learning as long as relational and featural categories are learned
in similar ways. But if they are learned in different ways, then little
or nothing we know about the acquisition of feature-based cate-
gories will necessarily apply to the case of relational concepts and
categories.
Consider the well-known prototype effects in category learning
(effects so robust they led Murphy, 2002, to quip that any exper-
iment that fails to show them is suspect). One of the most basic
of these effects is that participants are capable of learning cat-
egories with a family resemblance structure—that is, a structure
in which every member of a category shares more features with
the prototype of its own category than it does with the proto-
type of the contrasting category, but no single feature is shared
by all members of the category. As noted by Kittur et al. (2004,
2006), this effect has always been demonstrated using categories
deﬁned by their exemplars’ features. These researchers wondered
whether they could also demonstrate prototype effects in cate-
gories deﬁned, not by the exemplars’ features, but by the relations
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among those features. In Kittur et al.’s (2004, 2006) experiments
each exemplar was a two-part “object” consisting of an octagon
and a square. In the prototype of one category, the octagon was
larger than the square, darker than the square, above the square
(in the picture plane) and in front of the square; in the proto-
type of the other category, the octagon was smaller, lighter, below,
and behind the square. In a design typical of experiments demon-
strating prototype effects, the categories had a family resemblance
structure, such that each exemplar possessed three relations typi-
cal of its own prototype and one relation typical of the opposite
prototype and no relation was shared by all members of either
category.
Consistent with the hypothesis that relational categories are
not learned in the same way as feature-based categories, Kittur
et al. (2004, 2006); see also (Jung and Hummel, 2014) found that
people have great difﬁculty learning relational categories with a
probabilistic (i.e., family resemblance) structure. Their ﬁndings
are consistent with the hypothesis that people learn relational con-
cepts by a process of intersection discovery. Numerous researchers
have proposed that relational concepts are represented as schemas1:
relational structures that specify the properties of a concept or
category exemplar and the relations among those properties and
between the concept and other concepts (e.g., Gentner, 1983; Mur-
phy and Medin, 1985; Holland et al., 1986; Keil, 1989; Barsalou,
1993; Ross and Spalding, 1994). In turn, it has been proposed
(e.g., Gick and Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Hummel and Holyoak, 2003)
that schemas are learned by a process of structural alignment (i.e.,
analogical mapping; see Hummel and Holyoak, 2003) followed by
intersection discovery, in which a schema is learned from examples
by keeping what the examples have in common and disregarding
details on which they differ (see also Doumas et al., 2008). Align-
ment and intersection discovery are useful because they can reveal
relational generalities that might otherwise remain implicit in the
mental representation of the individual exemplars (see Doumas
et al., 2008). However, intersection discovery fails catastrophically
with probabilistic categories, inwhich the intersection is the empty
set: by deﬁnition, the intersection is that which is common to all
exemplars; in a probabilistic category structure, nothing is com-
mon to all exemplars. The ﬁndings of Kittur et al. (2004, 2006) are
consistent with this account of their participants’ failure to learn
their category structures.
Jung and Hummel (2014) extended the Kittur et al. (2004,
2006) ﬁndings by exploring the conditions under which proba-
bilistic relational categories can be rendered learnable. Our logic
was as follows: if the intersection discovery account of how we
learn relational categories is correct, then any task that encour-
ages participants to discover a relation that remains invariant
over members of a category (and which differs between cate-
gories) ought to make otherwise probabilistic relational categories
1For example a songbird schema might specify that a songbird eats seeds or insects,
nests in trees, ﬂies, and has wings and a beak (among other properties). In addition,
it would specify that having wings makes it possible for the songbird to ﬂy (i.e.,
explicitly specifying the relation between the properties has wings and the property
ﬂies) and that songbirds are members of the more general category birds (i.e., spec-
ifying the relation between songbirds and birds). Other kinds of schemas describe
the critical relations characterizing other domains of knowledge (see, e.g., Gick and
Holyoak, 1983).
learnable. Inorder to test this hypothesiswe created categorieswith
a logical structure identical to that of Kittur et al. (2004, 2006):
every exemplar consisted of a circle and a square, one of which
was larger than the other, one of which was darker, one of which
was in front the other, and one of which was above the other. In
the prototype of category A, the circle was larger, darker, above
and in front of the square; in B it was smaller, lighter, below, and
behind. Each exemplar of either A or B shared three relations with
its prototype, and no relation was constant across all members of
a category. (In the Kittur et al. (2004, 2006) studies, the category
structures were identical except that an octagon was used in place
of the circle.) All we manipulated between participants was the
instructions participants were given, and thus the task they were
nominally performing.
In the “categorize” condition of Jung and Hummel (2014),
Experiment 1, participants were instructed to categorize each
exemplar as either an A or a B. In the “who’s winning?” condi-
tion, participants were instructed to determine whether the circle
or the square was“winning.” Importantly, the tasks were otherwise
completely isomorphic: any exemplar a participant in the “win-
ning” condition would correctly classify as “the circle is winning”
(by pressing the A key), a participant in the categorize condition
would correctly classify as a member of category A (by pressing
the A key); and any exemplar correctly classiﬁed as “the square is
winning” (by pressing the B key) would correctly be categorized as
a member of category B (by pressing the B key). We hypothesized
that the“who’swinning”task—but not the categorize task—would
encourage participants to discover a higher-order relation that
remained invariant over members of a category (namely, which
part, the circle or square, was in more “winning” roles of the
four relations) and thus render the categories learnable. In several
experiments, the results were exactly as predicted: participants
given the “who’s winning” task learned to criterion much faster
(and a much higher proportion of them reached criterion at all)
than participants given the categorize task, even though the cor-
rect response to each exemplar was exactly the same across the
tasks. This result is consistent with Kittur et al.’s (2004, 2006)
interpretation of their ﬁndings in terms of participants invoking
the psychological mechanisms responsible for schema induction
(by intersection discovery) when faced with the task of learning
a relational category structure. Speciﬁcally, the invariant partic-
ipants appear to be learning in the “who’s winning” condition is
something like,“The circle [or square] hasmore points, so it wins.”
In the case of this invariant, it does not matter which relations give
rise to the points; it only matters which shape has more of them.
As a result, this learning procedure is robust to the variation in the
individual relations giving rise to the “points.”
Althoughparticipants in the“who’swinning”condition learned
much faster and more reliably than those in the categorize con-
dition, as noted previously, roughly half the participants even in
the categorize condition eventually learned to correctly classify
the exemplars. Our primary motivation in the current study was
to investigate what makes the probabilistic relational categories
learnable in those participants that do manage to learn them. On
the strictest interpretation of the intersection discovery hypoth-
esis, this ought to be impossible: the intersection is always the
empty set, so the categories should never be learnable by anyone.
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How do those participants who learn the categories manage
to do so?
POLYSEMY, HIERARCHICAL CATEGORIES, AND PROBABILISTIC
RELATIONAL CATEGORIES
Onepossibility, suggested by Lakoff (1987), is that putatively prob-
abilistic relational categories may in fact be polysemous. Consider
for example, the category mother. Mother is a relational category
(since a person’s membership in the category is deﬁned by her
relationship to her child), and although it may, at ﬁrst, seem
to be deterministic, there are in fact different kinds of moth-
ers: birth mothers and adoptive mothers; caring and neglectful
mothers; loving and abusive mothers, etc. The result is that
no single relation (either genetic, care-based or emotional) nec-
essarily characterizes every kind of mother. That is, mother is
polysemous: a single label that refers to similar but nonetheless
different categories of relationships. This possibility suggests a
solution to the problem of learning probabilistic relational cat-
egories: rather than learning that all the exemplars belong to a
single (probabilistic) category, perhaps it is easier to learn mul-
tiple sub-categories (each of which is individually deterministic),
which are polysemous, in the sense of sharing a single label or
name. Accordingly, we reasoned that the participants in the Kittur
et al. (2004, 2006) and Jung and Hummel studies who managed
to learn to criterion may have done so by treating the categories
they were learning as polysemous: perhaps they somehow discov-
ered subordinate-level categories that were deterministic by virtue
of one or two relations remaining invariant, and then learned to
classify those sub-categories with a common label (as elaborated
shortly).
THE CURRENT EXPERIMENTS
The current experiments tested three hypotheses about factors
that might help people to learn otherwise probabilistic rela-
tional concepts. Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that learning
putatively probabilistic relational categories (like mother) can
be facilitated by rendering such categories polysemous, that is,
by training participants to learn deterministic sub-categories
(i.e., “subordinate-level” categorizations) concurrently with the
probabilistic category labels (i.e., “basic-level” categorizations).
This experiment also tested the hypothesis that comparison—
speciﬁcally, having the opportunity to explicitly compare the
exemplars of the subordinate-level categories—would facilitate
subordinate-level category learning. Comparison is thought to
play a central role in schema induction (e.g., Gick and Holyoak,
1980, 1983; Gentner, 1983; Hummel and Holyoak, 2003) and
relational learning (e.g., Doumas et al., 2008), and numerous
studies have demonstrated the facilitatory effect of compari-
son on the learning of relational concepts (e.g., Hammer et al.,
2008, 2009; Namy and Clepper, 2010; Augier and Thibaut,
2013; Kok et al., 2013; Kurtz et al., 2013; Carvalho and Gold-
stone, 2014; Guo et al., 2014). The results of Experiment 1
demonstrated that subordinate-level category learning facilitated
participants’ learning of our probabilistic relational category
structures, but only when participants were also allowed to com-
pare multiple exemplars of a category to one another on each
trial.
Experiment 2 extended Experiment 1 by investigating the
necessity of the concurrent subordinate- and basic-level learning.
In this experiment, participants were trained to classify exemplars
at the probabilistic basic level before the deterministic subordi-
nate level and learning did not improve relative to training on a
basic-level-only baseline. Experiment 2 also investigated the effect
of subordinate-level comparison without subordinate-level cat-
egory learning. That is, it investigated whether giving learners
the ability to compare two exemplars that would have belonged
to the same subordinate-level category (and thus shared two
invariant relations) during basic-level classiﬁcation—but with-
out explicit subordinate-level categorization— would improve
basic-level learning relative to a one-exemplar baseline. It did not,
suggesting that comparison, by itself, may not facilitate learning
probabilistic relational categories.
Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis that presenting the (deter-
ministic) prototype of each category alongside each (probabilistic)
exemplar during training would facilitate learning. This manip-
ulation is analogous to explicit instruction (e.g., in a classroom
setting) that although the exemplars are probabilistic in the rela-
tions they possess, they nonetheless derive from a deterministic
underlying category structure. The results suggest that this proce-
dure, like the subordinate-before-basic procedure of Experiment
1, facilitated participants’ learning. This experiment also tested
two additional variants of the comparison hypothesis tested in
Experiment 1 and provided weak support for that hypothesis.
An additional purpose of the current experiments was to
replicate the basic difﬁculty-of-probabilistic-relational-category
learning effect with new stimulus materials. Kittur et al. (2004,
2006) used stimuli composed of octagons and squares, and Jung
and Hummel (2014), (Experiments 1. . .3) used stimuli composed
of circles and squares. The current experiment used ﬁctional
“bugs” as stimuli (Figure 1). The purpose of using these new stim-
uli was simply to demonstrate whether the same effects obtain
with very different (arguably, more natural) stimulus materials.
Like the stimuli in the previous experiments, the categories used in
the current experiments were deﬁned by the relations among their
exemplars’ parts, and individual relations were probabilistically
related to category membership across exemplars.
CATEGORY STRUCTURES
The categories used in these experiments were ﬁctional “bug
species” deﬁned by the relations between the bugs’ head, body,
wings, and antennae. As shown in Figure 1 and Table 1, the pro-
totype of the category (species) “Fea” [1, 1, 1, 1] had a head wider
and darker than its body (relations r1 and r2; the ﬁrst two 1’s in the
vector), antennae longer than its head (r3) and wings longer than
its body (r4). The prototypical Dav [0, 0, 0, 0] had the opposite
relations, with its body wider and darker than its head (r1 and
r2), antennae shorter than its head (r3) and wings shorter than its
body (r4).
Any exemplar of Fea or Dav shared three relations with its
own prototype and one with the prototype of the opposite cat-
egory (Table 1). In other words, the formal category structures
used were isomorphic to those used by Kittur et al. (2004, 2006)
and Jung and Hummel (2014). All members of an exemplar class
(where a class corresponds to one of the eight binary codes in
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FIGURE 1 | Examples of the stimuli used in all the experiments.The top
two rows depict basic-level category Fea; the bottom two rows depict
basic-level category Dav. The left most column shows two examples of each
category prototype: Fea (1111) and Dav (0000). Columns 2. . .5 depict two
examples each of the categories’ speciﬁc exemplar classes. Columns
correspond to the exception relation deﬁning that class. For example,
exemplars in column 2 (0111 and 1000) differ from their respective prototypes
in the relative width of the bugs’ heads and bodies (r1). Examples of a
prototype or an exemplar class differ from one another in their metric
properties (e.g., head width) but share categorical relations (e.g., whether the
head is wider or narrower than the body). The ﬁgure shows two randomly
selected examples of each prototype or exemplar class, out of an open-ended
set of such examples (with each example differing from the others in its class
in terms of its precise metric properties). See text for details.
Table 1) share exactly the same deﬁning relations (e.g., all mem-
bers of 0111 have a heads that are narrower and darker than their
bodies, antennae longer than their heads and wings longer than
their bodies) but differ from one another in the exact numeri-
cal dimensions and darknesses of their heads, wings, antennae,
and bodies. That is, although relationally identical to one another,
members of an exemplar class are featurally different from one
another. Stimuli were generated by the computer while the subject
performed the experiment, randomly choosing the metric values
of the bugs’ parts to be consistent with the deﬁning relations. As
such, it is unlikely that any given subject would see exactly the
same bug more than once during the experiment.
In Experiment 1, participants learned to classify the bugs at a
subordinate level (Cim Fea [ﬁrst two exemplar classes in Column1
of Table 1], Kei Fea [last two exemplar classes in Column 1],
Sko Dav [ﬁrst two exemplar classes, Column 2] or Lif Dav [last
two exemplar classes, Column 2]). In Experiment 2, participants
Table 1 |The prototype and exemplar class for each species.





learned to classify the bugs at both the basic level (Fea vs. Dav)
and at the subordinate level. In Experiment 3, participants learned
each exemplar class as its own unique subordinate-level category
(Kei Fea, Bai Fea, Wou Fea, or Cim Fea for the Fea species; Haw
Dav, Ang Dav, Sko Dav, or Lif Dav for the Dav species). The basic
level categories were probabilistic, in the sense that each relation
was diagnostic of category membership 75% of the time, but no
single relation was fully diagnostic. However, each subordinate-
level category had two fully deterministic relations. For example,
in the two exemplars of Cim Fea, [1101] and [1110], relations
r1 and r2 both deterministically take the value 1; and in the two
exemplars of Sko Dav, [0010] and [0001], both take the value 0. As
such, Fea and Dav are polysemous, with deterministic subordinate
level categories.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 investigated the hypothesis that learning the cate-
gories’ deterministic subordinate-level labels would facilitate par-
ticipants’ learning of their polysemous (probabilistic) basic-level
labels. It also investigated the necessity of explicit subordinate-




Forty ﬁve undergraduates enrolled at the University of Illinois
participated in Experiment 1 for course credit.
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Materials
Stimuli were line drawings of ﬁctional bugs as described above.
Subspecies of each species were made by grouping pairs of exem-
plars according to shared relations: Kei Fea = [0, 1, 1, 1] and [1, 0,
1, 1,], and Cim Fea = [1, 1, 0, 1] and [1, 1, 1, 0]; Sko Dav = [1,
0, 0, 0] and [0, 1, 0, 0], and Lif Dav = [0, 0, 1, 0], and [0, 0,
0, 1]. Eight trials per block were presented in the subordinate-
level with comparison condition, and 16 trials per block were
presented in the subordinate-level without comparison and basic
baseline conditions. Each exemplar was presented in a random
order once (subordinate-level with comparison condition) or twice
(subordinate-level without comparison and basic baseline condi-
tions) per block. There were only half as many trials per block in
the subordinate-level with comparison condition as in the other two
conditions because each trial of subordinate-level with comparison
presented two versions of each exemplar at a time, whereas the
other conditions presented only one exemplar per trial.
Design
The experiment used a three-condition (subordinate-level with
comparison vs. subordinate-level without comparison vs. basic
baseline) between-subjects design.
Procedure
All conditions consisted of two or more blocks of training trials
followed by two blocks of transfer trials. The training phase of the
experiment differed across conditions, as described above. Dur-
ing this phase of the experiment, participants received accuracy
feedback on each trial.
In the subordinate-level with comparison condition, each trial
of the training phase simultaneously presented two exemplars
belonging to the same subordinate-level category. Participants
identiﬁed the stimuli at the subordinate level (i.e., as Cim Fea, Kei
Fea, Sko Dav or Lif Dav) by clicking one of four boxes depict-
ing the relevant subordinate- and basic-level names under the
two bugs. This response was followed by accuracy feedback. See
the Appendix for ﬁgures depicting the participants’ task in each
condition of each experiment reported here.
In the subordinate-level without comparison condition (Figure
A2 in the Appendix), each trial depicted a single stimulus (rather
than a pair), but otherwise the procedure was identical to that
in the subordinate-level with comparison condition. In the basic
baseline condition, each trial depicted a single bug, which the
participant classiﬁed at the basic level only (Figure A3 in the
Appendix). In all three conditions, this training phasewas followed
by a transfer phase.
The training phase lasted 40 blocks (320 trials for the two
subordinate-level with comparison condition and 640 trials for the
other conditions) or until the participant responded correctly on at
least 87.5% (7/8 or 14/16) of the trials for two consecutive blocks,
whichever came ﬁrst. The transfer phase was the same across all
conditions. All participants classiﬁed the bugs at the basic level
only and received no accuracy feedback. 16 trials were presented
per block, with each exemplar presented in a random order once
per block. Each exemplar remained on the screen until the partic-
ipant responded. At the end of the experiment participants were
queried about strategies they used during the experiment.
RESULTS
Trials to criterion
Most of the participants (12 of 15) reached criterion in
subordinate-level with comparison, whereas only 1 of 15 reached
criterion in subordinate-level without comparison and none
reached criterion in basic baseline. A chi-square test of inde-
pendence showed that trials-to-criterion differed reliably across
conditions [χ2 (2, N = 45) = 25.187, p < 0.001].
In addition to the chi-square test, in all three experiments we
performed a more conservative test of our hypothesis (i.e., more
favorable to the null hypothesis) by comparing trials to criterion
across conditions (Figure 2). (Rather than converting each sub-
ject to a binary, did reach criterion vs. did not reach criterion as in
the chi-square test, the differences in trials to criterion preserve
metric differences between participants’ performance.) We made
this test even more conservative by treating those participants
who failed to reach criterion as though they had reached crite-
rion in the last block of learning. There was a reliable difference
between subordinate-level with comparison (M = 182, SD = 108)
and subordinate-level without comparison (M = 625, SD = 58)
[t(28) = −14.014, p < 0.001]. The performance in basic baseline
was the worst overall (M = 640, SD = 0).
Study phase accuracy
First, we report accuracy of subordinate-level classiﬁcation (Kei
Fea, Cim Fea, Sko Dav or Lif Dav) in the subordinate-level with
comparison and subordinate-level without comparison conditions
and accuracy of basic-level classiﬁcation (Fea or Dav) in the basic
baseline condition. Participants in subordinate-level with compar-
ison (M = 0.56, SD = 0.12) were more accurate than participants
in subordinate-level without comparison (M = 0.43, SD = 0.12)
[t(28) = 2.928, p < 0.01]. Participants in basic baseline were
the most accurate (M = 0.62, SD = 0.09; Figure 3). However,
chance performance in the two subordinate-level conditions was
0.25 whereas chance in the basic baseline condition was 0.5, so it
is difﬁcult to compare study phase accuracy directly across these
conditions. If we correct for chance performance by subtracting
each participant’s mean accuracy by chance performance in the
condition, then mean corrected accuracy is 0.31 in subordinate
FIGURE 2 |Trials to criterion by study condition in Experiment 1. Error
bars represent SEs. ***p < 0.001.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean accuracy by study condition in Experiment 1. Error
bars represent SEs. *p < 0.05.
with comparison condition, 0.18 in subordinate without comparison
and 0.12 in basic baseline. (Of course, this correction has no effect
on the results of the t-tests.)
Transfer phase accuracy
A three-way (subordinate-level with comparison vs. subordinate-
level without comparison vs. basic baseline) between-subjects
ANOVA revealed main effects of task [F(2,44) = 11.880,
MSE= 0.149, p< 0.001; Figure 4]. Participants in the subordinate-
level with comparison condition (M = 0.86, SD = 0.11) showed
reliably more accurate performance during transfer than partic-
ipants in the subordinate-level without comparison (M = 0.72,
SD = 0.09; Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.01) and basic baseline conditions
(M = 0.67, SD = 0.13; Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001). There was no
reliable difference between transfer in the subordinate-level without
comparison and basic baseline conditions (Tukey’s HSD, p = 0.36).
DISCUSSION
Both in terms of trials to criterion during learning and in terms
of accuracy of basic-level classiﬁcation during transfer, training
participants to classify stimuli at a deterministic subordinate level
and allowing them to explicitly compare multiple exemplars of a
subordinate-level category to one another (the subordinate-level
FIGURE 4 | Mean accuracy by transfer condition in Experiment 1. Error
bars represent SEs. **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
with comparison condition) improved category learning relative
to simply training the stimuli at the basic level only (the basic
baseline condition) and relative to simply training the stimuli at
the subordinate level without the opportunity to compare them
(the subordinate-level without comparison condition). This ﬁnding
suggests that, as hypothesized, rendering probabilistic relational
categories polysemous (and thus deterministic at the subordinate
level)makes themmore learnable, but that this facilitatory effect of
polysemy (at least in our data) depends on participants having the
opportunity to compare members of the same subordinate-level
category and thus observe which relations they have in common.
EXPERIMENT 2
If deterministic subordinate-level learning is to facilitate prob-
abilistic basic-level learning, then it seems necessary for the
subordinate-level learning to temporally precede (or at least pro-
ceed at the same time as) the basic-level learning (see also
Anderson,1991; Love et al., 2004;Mathy et al., 2013)2. Accordingly,
in the subordinate-level conditions of Experiment 1, participants
viewed pairs of exemplars from the same subordinate-level cat-
egory on each trial and learned to classify the stimuli at the
subordinate level before being required to transfer learning to
the basic level. Experiment 2 investigated the necessity of the
subordinate-before-basic learning order used in Experiment 1. In
the basic-level ﬁrst with comparison condition of Experiment 2,
participants were trained to classify exemplars at the probabilistic
basic level before classifying them at the deterministic subordinate
level. This experiment also investigated the effect of subordinate-
level comparison without subordinate-level category learning: in
the basic-level only with comparison condition of this experiment,
participants viewed pairs of exemplars that would have belonged
to the same subordinate-level category, but only learned to classify
them at the basic level. The basic baseline condition of Experiment
2 was identical to that condition of Experiment 1: on each trial,
the participant viewed only a single exemplar and classiﬁed it only
at the basic level.
METHOD
Participants
Forty four undergraduates enrolled at the University of Illinois
participated in the study for course credit. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions.
2In most circumstances, if a (e.g., subordinate-level learning) is to cause or facili-
tate b (basic-level learning), then a must precede (or at least operate concurrently
with) b. In the context of basic- and subordinate-level category learning, this claim
may appear at odds with the developmental literature, which shows that children
learn terms for basic-level categories before they learn terms for subordinate-level
categories (e.g., Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Johnson and Mervis, 1997). However, the
order in which children lean names for things may not necessarily coincide exactly
with the order in which concepts are acquired or even accessed on-line. Jolicoeur
et al. (1984) showed that the entry level of object categorization—the level of ﬁrst
perceptual/conceptual access during object recognition—resides at a level below the
basic level. For example, upon viewing a picture of a Boeing 747, one recognizes
it as a jumbo jet (a subordinate-level categorization) before one recognizes it as an
airplane (the basic-level categorization). In this sense, even the (possibly feature-
based) concept airplane may be polysemous. Anderson (1991) and Love et al. (2004)
have also noted that, depending on the structure of exemplars within categories, it is
often advantageous to acquire subordinate-level concepts before higher-level ones,
even when not explicitly directed to do so.
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FIGURE 5 |Trials to criterion by study condition in Experiment 2. Error
bars represent SEs. ***p < 0.001.
Materials
The stimuli and category structures were identical to those used
in Experiment 1.
Design
The experiment used a three condition (basic-level ﬁrst with com-
parison vs. basic-level only with comparison vs. basic baseline)
between-subjects design.
Procedure
All conditions consisted of two or more blocks of training trials
followed by two blocks of transfer trials. The training phase of the
experiment differed across conditions, as described above. Dur-
ing this phase of the experiment, participants received accuracy
feedback on each response made on each trial.
In the basic-level ﬁrst with comparison condition (Figure A4
in the Appendix), each trial of the training phase simultaneously
presented two exemplars. Participants identiﬁed the stimuli at the
basic level by clicking on boxes under the bugs. This response
was followed by accuracy feedback. Next, they re-identiﬁed the
same bugs at the subordinate-level. Although Figure A4 depicts
both the subordinate- and basic-level response boxes (as though
they were on the screen simultaneously for the subject), in the
experiment, the subordinate-level response boxes appeared on the
screen only after the subject had made her basic-level response. In
the basic-level only with comparison condition (Figure A5 in the
Appendix), participants again viewed pairs of bugs belonging to
the same subordinate-level species, but were given only the basic-
level identiﬁcation task. In the basic baseline control condition,
bugs were presented one at a time in the center of the screen,
asking participants to identify each bug at the basic level.
The transfer phase was the same across all conditions and
identical to that of Experiment 1.
RESULTS
Trials to criterion
All participants in the basic-level ﬁrst with comparison and basic-
level only with comparison conditions reached criterion, whereas
only 50% of participants in the basic baseline condition reached
criterion (Figure 5). A chi-square test revealed that the number of
participants who reached criterion differed reliably by condition
[χ2 (2, N = 44) = 18.904, p < 0.001].
Amore conservative three-way (basic-level ﬁrst with comparison
vs. basic-level only with comparison vs. basic baseline) between-
subjects ANOVA on trials to criterion revealed a main effect of
task [F(2,41) = 78.511, MSE = 12482.691, p < 0.001]. As shown
in Figure 5, participants in the basic-level ﬁrst with comparison
condition (M = 102, SD = 64) took reliably fewer trials to reach
criterion than those in the basic baseline condition (M = 537,
SD = 173; Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001). Participants also reached cri-
terion in fewer trials in basic-level only with comparison condition
(M = 82, SD = 52) than in the basic baseline condition [Tukey’s
HSD, p < 0.001]. However, the basic-level ﬁrst with comparison
and basic-level only with comparison conditions did not differ from
one another reliable in terms of trials to criterion [Tukey’s HSD,
p = 0.52].
Study phase accuracy
A three-way (basic-level ﬁrst with comparison vs. basic-level only
with comparison vs. basic baseline) between-subjects ANOVA on
the data from the study phase revealed a main effect of condition
[F(2,44) = 11.914, MSE = 0.145, p < 0.001; Figure 6]. Partici-
pants in the basic-level ﬁrst with comparison condition were more
accurate (M = 0.70, SD = 0.10) than participants in the basic base-
line condition (M = 0.62, SD = 0.08; Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.05), as
were participants in the basic-level only with comparison condition
(M = 0.71, SD = 0.07; Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.05). Performance in
the basic-level ﬁrst with comparison condition was almost identical
to performance in the basic-level only with comparison condition.
(Tukey’s HSD, p = 0.99).
Transfer phase accuracy
A three-way (basic-level ﬁrst with comparison vs. basic-level only
with comparison vs. basic baseline) between-subjects ANOVA
revealed main effects of task [F(2,41) = 9.298, MSE = 0.008,
FIGURE 6 | Mean accuracy by study condition in Experiment 2. Error
bars represent SEs. *p < 0.05.
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p < 0.001; Figure 7]. Participants in the basic-level only with
comparison condition (M = 0.79, SD = 0.06) showed reliably
more accurate performance during transfer than participants
in the basic-level ﬁrst with comparison condition (M = 0.71,
SD = 0.13; Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.05) and in the basic baseline con-
dition (M = 0.65, SD = 0.09; Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001). There was
no reliable difference between transfer in the basic-level ﬁrst with
comparison and basic baseline conditions (Tukey’s HSD, p = 0.32).
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 2 replicate the facilitatory effect of
comparison observed in Experiment 1 and are consistent with
the hypothesis that adding a subordinate-level comparison does
not facilitate learning unless it precedes basic-level learning. Par-
ticipants in the basic-level only with comparison condition (who
were able to compare exemplars of the same subordinate-level
categories but who did not learn the subordinate-level labels)
learned to criterion much faster than those in the basic baseline
condition, but those in basic-level ﬁrst with comparison (who did
learn the subordinate-level label) did not learn faster than those
in basic-level only with comparison. In fact, the trend, although
not statistically reliable, was in the opposite direction. Likewise, in
terms of transfer performance, participants in basic-level only with
comparison categorized the stimuli more accurately than either
those in basic baseline or those in basic-level ﬁrst with comparison.
When it follows the basic-level learning task, the subordinate-level
task does not improve the rate of category learning and hinders
transfer performance, relative to exemplar comparison alone.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 investigatedwhether exposure to the (deterministic)
prototype of an otherwise probabilistic relational category, along
with the members of that category, could facilitate participants’
learning of probabilistic relational categories. Our hypothesis
was that comparing the exemplars to the prototype would help
participants learn to categorize the stimuli in terms of prototype-
plus-exception rules. For example, mapping the prototype [1, 1,
1, 1] to the exemplar [1, 0, 1, 1] might result in a schema that
includes r1, r3, and r4, but lacks r2 (i.e., [1, -, 1, 1]). Whichever
FIGURE 7 | Mean accuracy by transfer condition in Experiment 2. Error
bars represent SEs. *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
exemplar is compared to the prototype, the resulting schema will
always produce one of the probabilistic category structures, minus
the mismatching relation (i.e., in the case of Fea, [-, 1, 1, 1], [1, -,
1, 1], [1, 1, -, 1], or [1, 1, 1, -]).
Experiment 3 also differed from Experiments 1 and 2 in the
design on the subordinate-level categories. In Experiments 1 and
2, each basic-level category had two subordinate-level categories,
with the result that, within a subordinate-level category, two rela-
tionswere deterministic and twowere probabilistic. In Experiment
3, each basic-level category had four subordinate-level categories,
with the result that, within a subordinate-level category, all four
relations were deterministic.
On each trial in the prototype condition of Experiment 3 (Figure
A6 in the Appendix), participants saw a prototype of a basic-level
category (i.e., Fea or Dav) on the left of the screen and an exem-
plar of that species (i.e., an exemplar of one subordinate-level
category) on the right of the screen. (Recall that the categories
are deﬁned in terms of the relations between the exemplars’ parts,
not the precise metric values of those parts. As such, different
instances of the prototype of a category will not be identical to
one another, even though they will have all the same categori-
cal relations between their parts.) Their task was to classify the
prototype at the basic-level and the exemplar at its subordinate-
level (e.g., Kei Fea, Bai Fea, Wou Fea, or Cim Fea). One again,
although Figure A6 depicts both the basic- and subordinate-
level response boxes, in the experiment, the subordinate-level
response boxes appeared on the screen only after the subject
had made her basic-level response. We hypothesized that pro-
viding the category prototype along with each exemplar of that
category might provide participants with an explicit hierarchi-
cal structure that could facilitate category learning. If so, then
each subordinate label would be associated with the relational dif-
ference between that exemplar and the prototype of its category
(the exception relation): for example, Kei Fea (narrower head),
Bai Fea (lighter head), Wou Fea (shorter antenna), and Cim Fea
(shorter wing).
The two different exemplars condition (Figure A7 in the
Appendix) tested whether presenting exemplars from the same
basic-level category but different subordinate-level categories
could facilitate learning. In this condition, each trial presented
two different exemplars of the same basic-level category. After
identifying the exemplars at the basic-level, participants also iden-
tiﬁed each exemplar at its own subordinate-level. (Again, the
subordinate-level response boxes appeared on the screen after the
subject made her basic-level response.) In this condition, exem-
plars were not paired within trials in order to correspond to
systematic subordinate-level categories (i.e., they were not paired
in a way that was likely to reveal invariant relations). Accordingly,
the intersection discovery and polysemy hypotheses predict little
or no facilitation in this condition relative to the basic baseline
condition.
The two same exemplars condition of the current experiment
(Figure A8 in the Appendix) presented two exemplars from the
same subordinate level category on each trial. The task was to
classify the stimuli ﬁrst at the basic level and then at the subor-
dinate level. (The subordinate-level response boxes appeared on
the screen only after the subject made her basic-level response.)
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In this condition, the two exemplars had identical categorical rela-
tions between their parts but nonetheless differed in the metric
properties of those parts.
In addition, there were two control conditions (Figure A9 in
the Appendix). In the subordinate baseline condition, each trial
presented a single bug and the task was to categorize it at the basic
level ﬁrst, followed by the subordinate level. The basic baseline
condition was the same except that the participant’s only task was
to classify the bug at the basic-level.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 96 undergraduates enrolled at the University of Illi-
nois participated in the study for course credit. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of ﬁve conditions.
Materials
The same bug stimuli were used in this experiment as in Exper-
iment 1 and 2. However, in this experiment, each exemplar,
including the prototype, of each category was associated with a
unique label: for the Fea species [1, 1, 1, 1] was the prototype
(labeled simply “Fea”), Kei Fea = [0, 1, 1, 1], Bai Fea = [1, 0, 1, 1,],
Wou Fea = [1, 1, 0, 1], and Cim Fea = [1, 1, 1, 0] served as the sub-
ordinates; for the Dav species [0, 0, 0, 0] was the prototype(labeled
simply “Dav”), Haw Dav = [1, 0, 0, 0], Ang Dav = [0, 1, 0, 0], Sko
Dav = [0, 0, 1, 0], and Lif Dav = [0, 0, 0, 1] were the subordinates.
Design
The experiment used a ﬁve-condition (prototype vs. two different
exemplars vs. two same exemplars vs. subordinate baseline vs. basic
baseline) between-subjects design.
Procedure
All conditions were provided two or more blocks of training trials
consisting of basic and subordinate classiﬁcation tasks (only the
basic task was provided in basic baseline), followed by two blocks
of transfer trials, as in the previous experiments. The training
phase of the experiment differed across conditions, as described
below. During training, participants received accuracy feedbackon
each trial. The transfer phase was the same across all conditions.
Participants classiﬁed the bugs at the basic level only and they
received no accuracy feedback.
In the prototype condition, participantswere shown a prototype
on the left side of the screen. They ﬁrst categorized the prototype
as Fea or Dav with a mouse click. Following this response, an
exemplar of the same basic-level category appeared on the right
of the screen (the prototype remained on the screen) and the
participant classiﬁed it at its subordinate level with a button click.
In the two different exemplars condition, two different exem-
plars belonging to the same species, randomly chosen, were
displayed simultaneously. Participants ﬁrst classiﬁed both bugs
at the basic level and then classiﬁed each at its own subordinate
level.
The two same exemplars condition was identical to the two dif-
ferent exemplars condition, except that two exemplars came from
the same subordinate level, so therewas only one subordinate-level
response.
In the subordinate baseline condition, the participant classiﬁed
one bug per trial at both the basic and subordinate levels. In the
basic baseline condition participants classiﬁed each bug at the basic
level only.
In the prototype, two different exemplars, and two same exem-
plars conditions, each training block consisted of eight trials. In
the subordinate baseline, and basic baseline conditions, each train-
ing block consisted of 16 trials. In all conditions, the transfer phase
was identical to the learning phase of the basic baseline condition.
There were two blocks of 16 trials each, with each exemplar pre-
sented in a randomorder once per block. The training phase lasted
for 40 blocks (320 trials for prototype, two different exemplars, and
two same exemplars, and 640 trials for subordinate baseline, and
basic baseline) or until the participant responded correctly on at
least 87.5% of the trials for two consecutive blocks. At the end
of the experiment participants were queried about strategies they
had used during the experiment.
RESULTS
Trials to criterion
Only in the prototype condition did all participants reach crite-
rion. 55% of participants reached criterion in the two different
exemplars condition, 44% in the two same different exemplars con-
dition, 16% in the subordinate baseline condition, and 68% in
the basic baseline condition reached criterion. A chi-square test
results showed that the proportions of participants who reached
criterion differed reliably by condition [χ2 (4, N = 96) = 30.503,
p < 0.001].
A more conservative ﬁve-way (prototype vs. two different exem-
plars vs. two same exemplars vs. subordinate baseline vs. basic
baseline) between-subjects design ANOVA on trials to criterion
revealed amain effect of task [F(4,91)= 107.139,MSE= 8776.459,
p < 0.001; Figure 8]. As expected, participants reached cri-
terion in fewer trials in prototype (M = 36, SD = 27) than
in two different exemplars (M = 239, SD = 89; Tukey’s HSD,
p < 0.001), two same exemplars (M = 285, SD = 69; Tukey’s
HSD, p < 0.001), subordinate baseline (M = 592, SD = 113;
Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001), and basic baseline (M = 496, SD = 133;
Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001). Participants in two different exemplars
task (M = 239, SD = 89) took reliably fewer trials to reach cri-
terion than those in subordinate baseline (M = 592, SD = 113;
Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001) and those in basic baseline (M = 496,
SD = 133; Tukey’sHSD,p< 0.001). Participants in two same exem-
plars (M = 285, SD = 69) also took reliably fewer trials to reach
criterion than those in subordinate baseline (M = 592, SD = 113;
Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001) and those in basic baseline (M = 496,
SD = 133; Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001). Participants in basic baseline
(M = 592, SD = 113) took reliably fewer trials to reach criterion
than those in subordinate baseline (M = 496, SD = 133; Tukey’s
HSD, p < 0.05).
Study phase accuracy
A ﬁve-way (prototype vs. two different exemplars vs. two same
exemplars vs. subordinate baseline vs. basic baseline) between-
subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of task [F(4,91) = 45.518,
MSE = 0.008, p < 0.001; Figure 9]. Participants in the proto-
type condition performed more accurately than those in all other
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FIGURE 8 |Trials to criterion by study condition in Experiment 3. Error
bars represent SEs.
conditions. Prototype learners (M = 0.92, SD = 0.06) were likely
to perform more accurately than two different exemplars learners
(M = 0.66, SD = 0.11; Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001), two same exem-
plars learners (M = 0.63, SD = 0.09; Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001),
subordinate baseline learners (M = 0.60, SD = 0.08; Tukey’s HSD,
p < 0.001), and basic baseline learners (M = 0.64, SD = 0.08;
Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.001). There were no other reliable differ-
ences between the conditions at the basic level during the study
phase.
Transfer phase accuracy
A ﬁve-way (prototype vs. two different exemplars vs. two same
exemplars vs. subordinate baseline vs. basic baseline) between-
subjects ANOVA revealed a main effect of task [F(4,91) = 5.943,
MSE = 0.011, p < 0.001; Figure 10]. Participants in prototype
(M = 0.80, SD = 0.07) showed reliably more accurate transfer
performance than those in two different exemplars (M = 0.69,
SD = 0.10; Tukey’s HSD,p< 0.01), two same exemplars (M = 0.68,
SD= 0.11; Tukey’sHSD,p< 0.01), subordinate baseline (M = 0.65,
FIGURE 9 | Mean accuracy by study condition in Experiment 3. Error
bars represent SEs. ***p < 0.001.
FIGURE 10 | Mean accuracy by transfer condition in Experiment 3. Error
bars represent SEs. **p < 0.01.
SD = 0.16; Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.01) and basic baseline (M = 0.68,
SD = 0.07; Tukey’s HSD, p < 0.01).
DISCUSSION
Experiment 3 examined whether providing participants with pro-
totypes of the basic-level categories would facilitate their learning
of the exemplars of those categories. As expected, performance in
the prototype condition exceeded performance in the other con-
ditions. Participants in the Prototype condition were over 90%
correct classifying the prototype during learning and 80% cor-
rect during transfer. Their accuracy during transfer demonstrates
that, in addition to learning the prototypes, these participants
also learned the exemplars. These results are consistent with the
hypothesis that explicitly providing the prototype can help learn-
ers overcome the difﬁculties posed by the empty intersection
problem, and are consistent with the hypothesis that explicitly
providing the prototypes helps participants to learn the exemplars
in a prototype-plus-exception fashion.
Consistent with the intersection discovery and polysemy
hypotheses, randomly pairing different exemplars of the same
basic-level categories during study (the two different exemplars
condition) did not reliably improve learning over simply training
one exemplar at a time (basic baseline or subordinate base-
line). However, systematically pairing members of the same
subordinate-level category (the two same exemplars condition)
also failed to improve learning. Participants’ comparatively poor
performance in the two same exemplars condition of this experi-
ment represents a replication of the basic level ﬁrst condition of
Experiment 2.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Although people have great difﬁculty learning relational categories
with a probabilistic structure, roughly half of the participants
in previous studies on probabilistic relational category learn-
ing have eventually managed to do so (Kittur et al., 2004, 2006;
Jung and Hummel, 2011, 2014). In the current study, three
experiments tested the hypothesis that those participants who do
manage to learn probabilistic relational categories do so by learn-
ing those categories as polysemous collections of deterministic
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subordinate-level categories. These experiments also investigated
the role of explicit within-category comparison in this pro-
cess, as well as the related hypothesis that explicitly exposing
learners to the prototypes of probabilistic relational categories can
help them to acquire these otherwise difﬁcult-to-learn category
structures.
Experiment 1 showed that, combined with the opportunity to
explicitly compare members of the same (probabilistic) basic-level
category, learning to categorize exemplars at a deterministic sub-
ordinate level facilitated subsequent learning of their probabilistic
basic-level structures. However, without the opportunity to make
these explicit comparisons, subordinate-level training was not suf-
ﬁcient to improve learning relative to basic-level category training.
This ﬁnding is consistent with previous research demonstrating
the role of explicit comparison in relational learning (Hammer
et al., 2008, 2009; Namy and Clepper, 2010; Augier and Thibaut,
2013; Kok et al., 2013; Kurtz et al., 2013; Carvalho and Goldstone,
2014; Guo et al., 2014).
Experiment 2 demonstrated that training the basic- and
subordinate-levels of classiﬁcation concurrently (with the basic-
level response preceding the subordinate-level response on a
trial-by-trial basis) did not improve category learning relative to
baseline (i.e., basic-baseline: training with the basic-level only). By
contrast, comparison of multiple exemplars without subordinate-
level training did facilitate category learning, albeit less without
subordinate-level training than with subordinate-level training:
although we did not conduct a between-experiment statistical
test on the difference, the effect of subordinate-training-plus-
comparison (86% mean accuracy, Experiment 1) was numerically
greater than the effect of comparison-only (79% mean accuracy,
Experiment 2). However, together, these experiments suggest
that comparison of multiple exemplars has a greater impact on
learning of probabilistic relational categories than does explicit
subordinate-level training.
Experiment 3 demonstrated that explicitly training partici-
pants to classify the (deterministic) category prototypes helps
them to learn to classify the individual (probabilistically related)
exemplars. This effect is consistent with the hypothesis that
explicit training with the prototype helps participants to learn
the exemplars as speciﬁc exceptions to the otherwise deterministic
category.
At ﬁrst blush, the results of Experiments 1–3 appear to provide
only weak support for the hypothesis that those participants (e.g.,
in Kittur et al., 2004; Jung and Hummel, 2011, 2014) who manage
to learn probabilistic relational categories do so by ﬁrst learning to
categorize those exemplars asmembers of individually determinis-
tic subordinate-level categories. Instead, comparison seems to play
a much larger role in participants’ acquisition of our probabilis-
tic relational bug categories, whether comparison of exemplars
within the same subordinate-level category (the subordinate with
comparison condition of Experiment 1 and the basic only with
comparison condition of Experiment 2) or comparison of exem-
plars with their category prototype (the prototype condition of
Experiment 3).
However, it is important to note that comparison, alone,
did not facilitate learning: in particular, comparing randomly
paired exemplars of the same category (the two different exemplars
condition of Experiment 3) did not improve learning relative
to baseline. Instead, only those comparisons that made it pos-
sible for learners to discover relations that remain invariant,
either over subordinate-level categories (Experiments 1 and 2)
or over the prototype itself (Experiment 3), facilitated learning.
As long as learners are provided with the opportunity to make
these invariant-revealing comparisons, it appears to make little
difference whether the resulting subordinate-level categories are
explicitly labeled. But without the opportunity to make these
invariant-revealing comparisons, simply forcing participants to
learn names for the invariant-bearing subordinate-level categories
(e.g., the subordinate without comparison condition of Experiment
1) seems to make little difference to learning.
Applying these lessons to the case of polysemous real-world
relational categories, such as mother, is revealing. As children,
we do not need to learn separate names for adoptive vs. birth
mothers, or for abusive vs. loving mothers. Instead, as pointed
out by the label polysemous, all these different concepts bear
the same simple name, mother. However, the ﬁndings reported
here suggest that acquiring these different (subordinate-level,
invariant-bearing) mother concepts may well be facilitated by the
opportunity to explicitly compare exemplars of these various kinds
of mothers.
The question of why explicit comparisons proved so crucial in
the experiments reported here cannot be answered by our cur-
rent ﬁndings, but it is tempting to speculate that without such
comparisons, the memory load of comparing an exemplar on
the computer screen to exemplars stored in memory may sim-
ply be too great. With two systematically related exemplars (or an
exemplar and a prototype) on the screen in front of a learner,
discovering which relations they have in common becomes a
matter of perception: the learner need only move her attention
between the bugs a few times to observe the relations they share
and then encode those relations into memory. But with only a
single bug on the screen, or with two bugs that are not system-
atically related (as in the two different exemplars condition of
Experiment 3), this kind of simple perceptual inspection cannot
reveal which relations are diagnostic of (sub-)category member-
ship: if there is only one bug on the screen, then it must be
compared with other bugs in memory; and before the bug has
been categorized, the learner cannot even know which of the
many bugs in memory to which it ought to be compared. And
although having two unsystematically related bugs on the screen
together alleviates the memory problem (rendering the discovery
of shared relations a perceptual problem), the shared relations so
revealed are not guaranteed to be the same as the shared rela-
tions in the next pair of bugs from the same basic-level category.
Although this explanation of our ﬁndings is intuitive, investi-
gating it more systematically is beyond the scope of the current
work.
In conclusion, the ﬁndings reported here—speciﬁcally, the
ﬁnding that comparisons that systematically reveal relations that
remain invariant over sub-classes of otherwise probabilistic rela-
tional categories—add to the growing body of evidence that
learning relational categories depends on, or is at least greatly
facilitated by, conditions that lead the learner to discover relational
invariants that predict category membership.
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As a ﬁnal note, it interesting to wonder whether the ﬁndings
reported here may provide an answer to Wittgenstein’s (1953)
challenge to deﬁne the category game. The difﬁculty of deﬁning
game was taken by Wittgenstein (1953)—and by the majority of
cognitive psychologists since then (see Murphy, 2002)—to mean
that game is a family resemblance category with no necessary
or sufﬁcient features. But perhaps game is not a (feature-based)
family resemblance category at all. Instead, it may be a collection
of polysemous relational categories comprised of, for example,
board games, card games, war games, athletic games, etc. And
although it is impossible to ﬁnd a single deﬁnition that captures
all these different kinds of games (like it is impossible to ﬁnd
a single relation that characterizes all kinds of mothers), per-
haps each individual kind of game is a deterministic relational
category. If this account is correct, and game is a polysemous rela-
tional category, then Wittgenstein’s (1953) famous puzzle, What
is the deﬁnition of a game? will turn out to have been a trick
question.
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